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Data from three non-linear public goods experiments provide evidence that the random
reassignment of participants to groups during a session does not have a significant effect on
voluntary contributions as compared with voluntary contributions made by participants in groups
whose members do not change over the session in which they participate.   This extends the
literature considering the effects of random rematching members of groups in voluntary
contribution games beyond those with linear payoff functions.






Hamilton, Ontario   L8S 4M4
Canada
Phone: 905-525-9140 x23822
e-mail: mestelma@mcmaster.caPartners and strangers in non-linear public goods environments
1. Introduction
Andreoni (1988) first introduced the partners and strangers treatments in voluntary
contribution games in an attempt to understand the relatively small effect that repetition had on
increasing free riding in linear public goods games conducted by Isaac and Walker (1988). 
Andreoni was interested in whether reputation effects were responsible for keeping voluntary
contributions above the single-shot dominant strategy of no contribution.  Andreoni’s conjecture
(Andreoni and Croson, 2002) was that “if reputations matter, then partners [a set of subjects who
played together in finitely repeated games] should cooperate more than strangers [a set of
subjects who played in a repeated single-shot games].”  This is the strategies hypothesis.
Andreoni considers strategic play and learning as explanations for the pattern of decay in
voluntary contributions found in linear public goods environments.  According to his strategies
hypothesis strategic play in partners groups will keep contributions from falling.  This may occur
either because individuals are attempting to keep others who are making contributions from
learning to free-ride, or because individuals are concerned that others will respond to free-riding
behaviour by free-riding themselves.  However, as the end of the game is approached, there is
less of an incentive to avoid free-riding, and voluntary contributions decline (Croson, 1996).  In
strangers groups, individuals have no reason to believe that they can affect the behaviour of
others in their group, because group membership changes after each decision round.  Under this
condition, the dominant strategy should prevail.  Learning results in the gradual decline of
voluntary contributions as individuals learn how to play the dominant strategy “over time”.  But
all participants do not come to this realization at the same time (Croson, 1996).  Therefore, the
decline in voluntary contributions occurs over a number of periods.1  Replication is close, but not precise.  Croson (1996) uses four person groups and
Andreoni (1988) uses five person groups.  Croson’s linear payoff function has the same marginal
per capita return to the group activity as does Andreoni’s and the same marginal return to the
private activity.
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Andreoni (1988) fails to support either his strategies or learning hypotheses.  Strangers
are more cooperative than partners and an unexpected restart of both partners and strangers
environments results in an increase in contributions, which is inconsistent with the learning
hypothesis that the continual decay over time will not be affected by the restart.  Croson (1996)
conducts an experiment which nearly replicates Andreoni’s design, and is able to conclude that
the strategies hypothesis can be supported.
1  Where Andreoni’s strangers groups contributed
more than his partners groups over the first ten periods of play, Croson’s partners groups
contributed more than her strangers groups.  Croson’s results are consistent with the strategies
hypotheses.
Andreoni and Croson (2002) survey experiments which consider partners and strangers
treatments in linear public goods settings and discover that the results regarding whether partners
contribute more than strangers are generally inconclusive.  Of nine papers surveyed, three show
partners contributing more than strangers, two show the reverse, and two show neither out-
contributing the other.  The remaining two papers have subject pools represented by participants
in six different countries.  These papers find that partners dominate in sessions run with Italian
and U.S. participants, strangers dominate in sessions with U.K. and Spanish participants, and
neither dominates in sessions with Japanese and Dutch participants.
This paper contributes to the data accumulating on the impact of the partners and
strangers treatments in public goods environments.  The data reported here were generated in2  Another difference between the linear and the non-linear environments described above
is the presence of a dominant strategy in the linear environment but not in the non-linear
environment.
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three experiments in which participants had identical endowments to allocate between a private
and group activities and identical payoff functions.  The difference between these environments
and those reported in Andreoni and Croson (2004) is the form of the payoff function.  Rather
than a payoff function of the form
Π i = (e i - g i ) + A(g i + G -i )( 1 )
where e i is individual i’s endowment in tokens, g i is individual i’s contribution to the group
activity,  G -i is the total group contribution to the public good excluding i’s contribution (and g i
+ G -i = G), and 0 # A # 1, the payoff function is
Π i = (e i - g i ) + B(g i + G -i ) + C(e i - g i )(g i + G -i ) (2)
where B, C > 0.
The payoff function represented by equation (1) yields a Nash equilibrium G
N = 0 and an
optimum G*  = Ne i , where N is the number of individuals in a group.  The optimal allocation is
not a Nash equilibrium.  The payoff function represented by equation (2) is parameterized to
yield an Nash equilibrium G
N > 0 and an optimum G
N < G* < Ne i .  Because it is possible for
participants in this environment to make voluntary contributions that are less than the individual
Nash equilibrium contribution, overall contributions may be less than the group Nash
equilibrium unlike the outcome in linear public good environments in which voluntary
contributions are necessarily greater than or equal the group Nash equilibrium contribution.  This
may result in differences between voluntary contributions by partners and strangers in non-linear
public goods environment than in linear environments.
23  Specific details of these sessions can be found in Chan et al. (1996, 1997, 2002).
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The data from the sessions reported here generally support a null hypothesis that there is
no difference in the volunatry contributions made in partners and strangers environments. 
However, there is still evidence that is consistent with the results reported by Croson (1996).
2. The Laboratory Environment
The data presented here come from three experiments (Chan et al., 1996, 1997, 2002)
which induce the same payoff functions for participants in baseline treatments (other treatments
varied among the experiments).  The payoff function given by equation (2), with B = C = 1.
The baseline treatments considered three-person groups of contributors with endowments
of twenty tokens each per decision round.  Payoffs were induced with a complete payoff matrix
and all participants knew that everyone in their groups had the same twenty token endowment
and the same payoff table.  The Nash equilibrium is unique for the group (G = 15) and for the
individual (gi = 5).  The optimal allocation is unique (G = 31) and any combination of individual
contributions adding to 31 will generate the same total payoff to the three-person group.  The
optimal allocation is not a Nash equilibrium outcome.  Similarly free-riding, in the sense that an
individual makes no contribution to the group activity, cannot be sustained as an Nash
equilibrium outcome.
The participants make voluntary contribution decisions for fifteen rounds.   They know
how many rounds they will play.  The sessions were conducted between 1992 and 1994.  Token
payoffs were converted into Canadian dollars are the end of a session and participants were paid
privately.   Payoffs ranged between $15 and $25 with a mean of approximately $20 and a
standard deviation of about $1.50.
34 The analyses in Chan et al. (1996, 1997, 2002) used data from the last twelve decisions
rounds.  Participants were paid according to their decisions in the first three rounds, but these
were treated as learning rounds and not included in the analyses of data.
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The partners environment was used in Chan et al. (1996).  This experiment contributes
data from fifteen participants in five groups.  The groups remained together for fifteen decision
rounds, but the participants did not know who were the other members of their groups.   The
strangers environment used in Chan et al. (1997) contributes data from twelve participants who
were reassigned to three-person groups in each of fifteen decision rounds.  Chan et al. (2002)
contributes data from sixty participants who were reassigned to three-person groups in each of
fifteen decisions rounds.  In this within-subject design, participants experienced a variety of
treatments, however each participant experienced the baseline treatment at least four times
during the last twelve decision rounds and once during the first three decisions rounds.
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3.  The Data
The unit of observation for the comparison of the partners and strangers treatments is the
contribution made by the three-person groups in each period.  The individual per period
contribution is not an appropriate unit of observation in the partners treatment because of the
interdependence of individuals within groups over time.  Although it is possible to calculate the
average contribution of a group over a session for partners, it is not possible to calculate a
comparable measure for the strangers treatment, because the individuals are reassigned to groups
each period.  Accordingly, the unit of observation will be the group in a period.  Each partnered
group provides an independent observation in a period, and the assumption underlying the
strangers treatment is that, because of the reassignment of individuals to groups, the group
contributions in the strangers treatment will be independent of one another.6
The data from the three experiments are summarized in Table 1.  The means and standard
deviations of the group contributions by treatment and period are reported along with the number
of observations in each period and p-values for exact randomization tests of the difference in per
period treatment means.  The contribution data are reported as the percentage of the gap between
the Nash equilibrium group contribution (15 tokens) and the optimal group contribution (31
tokens) that is realized by the group.  As an example, in period 8 the partners groups contributed,
on average, more than the Nash equilibrium, by 18.75 percent of the difference 15 and 31 tokens. 
The strangers groups, however, contributed less than the Nash equilibrium contribution by 10.23
percent of the difference between 15 and 31 tokens.  An exact randomization test on the
difference between 18.75 and -10.67, using the five partners groups and the six strangers groups
supports the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean of the partners groups
and the mean of the strangers groups against the alternative that the means are different (p =
0.249).
The data can be easily summarized.  Generally, partners contribute more towards the
public good than do strangers.  In all but one of the periods from 4 through 15 the partners
contribute more on average than do the strangers.  This is consistent with the Andreoni
conjecture.  However, only in one period, period 14, do the partners contribute significantly
more than the strangers.  Greater contributions by partners, but not significantly greater, is
consistent with Croson’s finding in a linear public good environment.
Croson (1996, p. 30) reports partners contributions being more variable than strangers. 
This is based on the distribution of individual contributions.  A difficulty with using the
distribution of individual contributions in a partners environment is that in any given period, the7
contributions of individuals who are partners are not independent.  This makes the estimate of
the standard deviation in this case suspect.  Using group contributions, however, a comparable
result emerges in the non-linear environment described here.  The contributions of partners
groups are more variable than are those of strangers groups.  From the sixth through fifteenth
periods the standard deviation of the partners groups exceeds that of the strangers group.  This is
consistent with a strategies hypothesis.  Individuals in strangers groups have no reason to expect
any signals they send in one period to have any effect on the behavior of the individuals with
whom they interact in the next period.  Because of the reassignment of group members,
reputations cannot be established and cooperative behavior of group members in one period
cannot be rewarded in the next.  Individuals in strangers environments have the incentive to
move towards the Nash equilibrium outcome fairly quickly.  In partners groups, successful
cooperation may emerge.  If it does not, the likely outcome is convergence towards the Nash
equilibrium.  If there is any successful cooperation, this will lead to group contributions which
are higher than the Nash outcome associated with non-cooperative behavior.  This could reveal
itself in the data as higher mean group contributions from the partners group than from the
strangers group and a higher standard deviation of the group contributions from partners than
from strangers.
One of the five groups of partners whose data is included here was able to cooperate and
maintain a group contribution of 30 tokens from period 5 through 15.  If we exclude this data
from the partners groups, the mean contribution will fall and the standard deviation of the
partners contributions will look very similar to that of the strangers group (instead of exceeding
the strangers standard deviation in every period from 6 through 15, in four of the ten periods, this8
is reversed).
Finally, the means and standard deviations included in Table 1 permit a parametric test of
the null hypothesis that group contributions equal the Nash equilibrium prediction of 15 tokens. 
From period 4 through 15, the only period in which the null hypothesis that the partners groups
contribution equals 15 can be rejected in favour of the alternative that contributions exceed the
Nash equilibrium is in period 4.  For the strangers group this occurs only in period 9.  One
difference between the linear public good environment and the non-linear environment is the
extent to which the Nash equilibrium characterizes the group outcomes.  A simple average
across the 10 periods prior to a restart, based on the figures presented in Andreoni and Croson
(2004), suggest that the mean contribution of partners and strangers groups is between 30 and 40
percent of the difference between the Nash equilibrium and the optimal contributions in their
linear public goods environments.  In the sessions reported here, over the first ten periods, the
contributions from partners and strangers groups is between 9 and 18 percent of the difference
between the Nash equilibrium and the optimal contributions.  This counts under-contributions as
zero.  Otherwise, this will bring the mean even closer to the Nash equilibrium.  Generally, the
Nash equilibrium organizes the data better in the non-linear environment than in the linear
environment.
4. Concluding Comments
The data from Chan et al. (1996, 1997, 2002) provide evidence to extend the
observations about partners and strangers treatments in laboratory public goods environments. 
When participants are provided with non-linear payoff functions which permit interior Nash
equilibria, Nash equilibrium predictions tend to organize the group contributions better than they9
do in linear environments, when strong free-riding (making no voluntary contributions) is the
Nash equilibrium prediction (this was first shown in Andreoni, 1993, and confirmed in Chan et
al., 1996, 1997, and 2002 for homogeneous groups).
The data presented here do not provide statistically significant evidence of a partners or
strangers effect on voluntary contributions to public goods when payoff functions are non-linear,
but they do provide some support for the conjecture made by Andreoni (1988) that we might
expect to see strategic cooperative behavior from participants in the partners environment that
will not emerge in the strangers environment.  It is the cooperative behavior from one group of
participants in the partners treatment in the data reported here that drives the differences that
appear to exist in these data.  Even though the sample is small, these data suggest that
Andreoni’s original conjecture regarding strategic behavior and its role in maintaining
contributions above the conventional Nash equilibrium in a public good environment may be
important.  Accordingly, it supports the conclusion by Andreoni and Croson (2004) that “it
seems only prudent that if a prediction is based on a single-shot equilibrium, then a Strangers
condition will be most appropriate.”10
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